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Abstract. Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss in Eurocrypt'98, allows a semi-
trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into an encryption of the same message intended
for Bob. PRE has recently drawn great interest, and many interesting PRE schemes have been proposed. However,
up to now, it is still an important question to come up with a chosen-ciphertext secure unidirectional PRE in the
adaptive corruption model. To address this problem, we propose a new unidirectional PRE scheme, and prove
its chosen-ciphertext security in the adaptive corruption model without random oracles. Compared with the best
known unidirectional PRE scheme proposed by Libert and Vergnaud in PKC'08, our schemes enjoys the advantages
of both higher eciency and stronger security.
Keywords. unidirectional proxy re-encryption, adaptive corruption model, chosen-ciphertext attack
1 Introduction
Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss[1] in Eurocrypt'98, allows a semi-
trust proxy to transform a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into an encryption of the same message
intended for Bob. The proxy, however, cannot learn anything about the messages encrypted under
either key. PRE turns out to be a very useful tool, and has found many practical applications, such as
distributed le systems[2;3], outsourced ltering of encrypted spam[2;3], and encrypted email forwarding[1],
etc. According to the direction of transformation, PRE can be categorized into bidirectional PRE and
unidirectional PRE. In bidirectional PREs, the proxy can transform from Alice to Bob and vice versa.
In contrast, the proxy in unidirectional PREs cannot transform ciphertexts in the opposite direction.
According to another criterion, PRE systems can also be classied into multi-hop PRE, in which the
ciphertexts can be transformed from Alice to Bob and then to Charlie and so on, and single-hop PRE, in
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which the ciphertexts can only be transformed once1.
In their seminal paper, Blaze et al.[1] proposed the rst bidirectional PRE scheme. In 2005, Ateniese
et al.[2;3] presented unidirectional PRE schemes from bilinear pairings. All of these schemes are only
secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). However, applications often require security against chosen-
ciphertext attacks (CCA). To ll this gap, in ACM CCS'07, Canetti and Hohenberger[4] presented the
rst CCA-secure bidirectional PRE scheme without random oracles. They left six open questions in ACM
CCS'07. One of these questions is to come up with a CCA-secure unidirectional PRE scheme without
random oracles. In PKC'08, Libert and Vergnaud[5] partially resolved this problem by presenting a single-
hop unidirectional PRE scheme without random oracles. They proved that their scheme is secure against
the replayable chosen-ciphertext attack (RCCA)[6] in the non-adaptive corruption model. Here RCCA-
security is a weaker variant of the CCA-security in the sense that a harmless mauling of the challenge
ciphertext is tolerated. In addition, the non-adaptive corruption model is somewhat weak, since the
adversary is required to commit ahead of time which public key she wants to challenge. Thus, in their
full paper2, Libert and Vergnaud left an open question of constructing a CCA-secure PRE scheme in the
adaptive corruption model.
To address this problem, in this paper, we propose a new single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme, and
prove its CCA-security (instead of RCCA-security) in the adaptive corruption model without random
oracles. In addition to the stronger security, our scheme is more ecient than Libert-Vergnaud's PRE
scheme[5].
1.2 Related Work
In ACM CCS'07, Canetti and Hohenberger[4] left an open question of constructing a CCA-secure PRE
scheme without pairings. In CANS'08, Deng et al.[8] successfully presented a CCA-secure bidirectional
PRE scheme without pairings in the random oracle model. In PKC'09, Shao and Cao[9] proposed a
unidirectional PRE without pairings, and claimed that their scheme is CCA-secure in the random oracle
model. However, Chow et al. [24] pointed out that Shao-Cao's scheme is not CCA-secure by giving a
concrete attack. In the same paper, Chow et al. also presented a more ecient CCA-secure unidirectional
PRE scheme without pairings in the random oracle model. Recently, Zhang et al.3 further showed that
Shao-Cao's comparisons[9] between their scheme and Libert-Vergnaud's is unfair, since Shao-Cao's scheme
is even not CPA-secure in Libert-Vergnaud's security model.
To control the proxy at a ne-grained level, Tang[10] and Weng et al.[11] independently introduced a vari-
ant of PRE named conditional proxy re-encryption (C-PRE). In such systems, ciphertexts are generated
with respect to a certain condition, and the proxy can translate a ciphertext only if the associated condition
is satised. Recently, Weng et al.[12] re-formalized the denition and security notions for C-PRE systems,
and presented a more ecient C-PRE scheme. Chu et al.[13] introduced a generalized concept named
conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption (CPBRE), and proposed a RCCA-secure CPBRE scheme.
Traceable proxy re-encryption, introduced by Libert and Vergnaud[14], attempts to solve the problem
of disclosing re-encryption keys, by tracing the proxies who have done so. Proxy re-encryption has also
been studied in identity-based scenarios, such as [15;16;17].
2 Preliminaries
1In refs. [2,3,5], for a single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme, the original ciphertext is named second level ciphertext, and the transformed
ciphertext is called rst level ciphertext. Through out this paper, we also follow these terminologies.
2Libert, B, Vergnaud, D. Unidirectional chosen-ciphertext secure proxy re-encryption. http://hal.inria.fr/inria-00339530/en/. This is
the extended version of [5].
3Zhang, X, Chen, M.R, Li, X. Comments on Shao-Cao's proxy re-encryption scheme from PKC 2009. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2009/344 (2009), http://eprint.iacr.org.
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2.1 Notations
For a nite set S, x
$ S means choosing an element x from S with a uniform distribution. For a string
x, we use jxj to denote its bit-length, [x]` denote its rst ` bits, and [x]` denote its last ` bits. We use
A(x; y;    ) to indicate that A is an algorithm with the input (x; y;    ). By z  A(x; y;    ), we indicate
the running of A(x; y;    ) letting z be the output. We use AO1;O2;(x; y;    ) to denote that A is an
algorithm with the input (x; y;    ) and can access to oracles O1;O2;    . By z  AO1;O2;(x; y;    ), we
denote the running of AO1;O2;(x; y;    ), and letting z be the output.
2.2 Bilinear Pairings
Let G and GT be two cyclic multiplicative groups with the same prime order p. A bilinear pairing
is a map e : G  G ! GT with the following properties: (i). Bilinearity: 8g1; g2 2 G;8a; b 2 Zp, we
have e(ga1 ; g
b
2) = e(g1; g2)
ab; (ii). Non-degeneracy: There exist g1; g2 2 G such that e(g1; g2) 6= 1GT ; (iii).
Computability: There exists an ecient algorithm to compute e(g1; g2) for 8g1; g2 2 G.
2.3 Complexity Assumptions
The security of our proposed schemes is based on a complexity assumption named 3-weak Decisional Bi-
linear Die-Hellman Inversion (3-wDBDHI) assumption4, which has been used by Libert and Vergnaud[5]
to construct unidirectional PRE schemes. The 3-wDBDHI problem in groups (G;GT ) is, given a tuple
(g; ga; g(a
2); g(a
3); gb; Q) 2 G5  GT with unknown a; b $ Zp, to decide whether Q = e(g; g)b=a. Libert
and Vergnaud[5] has proved that, the above problem is equivalent to how to decide whether Q is equal to
e(g; g)b=a
2
or a random value given (g; g1=a; ga; g(a
2); gb; Q).
A probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm B has advantage  in solving the 3-wDBDHI problem
in groups (G;GT ), ifPr hB g; g 1a ; ga; g(a2); gb; Q = e(g; g) ba2  = 1i  Pr hB g; g 1a ; ga; g(a2); gb; Q = e(g; g)c = 1i > ;
where the probability is taken over the random choices of a; b; c in Zp, the random choice of g in G, and
the random bits consumed by B.
We say that the (t; )-3-wDBDHI assumption holds in groups (G;GT ), if there exists no t-time algorithm
B that has advantage  in solving the 3-wDBDHI problem in (G;GT ).
2.4 TCR Hash Function
The notion of target collision resistant (TCR) hash function family of hash functions was shown by
Cramer and Shoup[18]. In a TCR hash function family, given a randomly chosen hash function H and
a random element x from the denition domain of H, it is infeasible for a PPT adversary H to nd
y 6= x such that H(x) = H(y). Informally, we dene the advantage of adversary H in attacking the
target collision resistance of H as AdvTCRH;H , Pr[A succeeds]. A TCR family is said to be target collision
resistant if the advantage AdvTCRH;H is negligible for any PPT adversary H and any hash function H chosen
from this TCR hash function family.
In practice, to build a target collision resistant hash function H, one can use a dedicated cryptographic
hash function such as SHA-1. For that reason and for simplicity of our presentation, hereinafter, we will
consider the hash function H to be a xed function.
2.5 Pseudorandom Function Family
We here review the denition of pseudorandom function family[19]. Let F : K D ! R be a function
family, where K is the set of keys of F , and D is the domain and R is the range. Let G : D ! R be a
true random function family. Let F be a PPT adversary which outputs a bit. We consider the following
4In ref. [5], Libert and Vergnaud also called this assumption as 3-Quotient Decision Bilinear Die-Hellman (3-QDBDH) assumption.
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two experiments:
Experiment ExpPRF-1F (F)
K
$ K
b
$ FF (K;)
Return b
Experiment ExpPRF-0F (F)
g
$ G
b
$ Fg()
Return b
We dene F 's advantage AdvPRFF;F in attacking the pseudorandomness of the function family F asPr hExpPRF-1F (F) = 1i  Pr hExpPRF-0F (F) = 1i :
If for any PPT adversary F , his advantage in attacking the pseudorandomness of the function family F
is negligible, then we say that F is a pseudorandom function family.
3 Model of Unidirectional PRE
In this section, we review the denition and security notions for unidirectional PREs. Since it is still
unknown how to construct a secure multi-hop unidirectional PRE scheme under proper security model,
we here concentrate on single-hop unidirectional PREs. Formally, a single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme
consists of the following algorithms[5]:
Setup(1k): The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1k and outputs the global parameters
param, which includes a description of the message space M.
KeyGen(param): On input of the security parameter 1k , all parties use this randomized algorithm to
generate a public/private key pair (pk; sk).
For brevity, we assume that param is implicitly included in the input of the other algorithms.
ReKeyGen(ski; pkj): The re-encryption key generation algorithm takes as input a private key ski and
another public key pkj. It outputs a re-encryption key rki!j.
Enc2(pk;m): On input of a public key pk and a message m 2 M, this encryption algorithm outputs a
second level ciphertext CT that can be re-encrypted into a rst level one (intended for a possibly
dierent receiver) using the suitable re-encryption key.
Enc1(pk;m): On input of a public key pk and a message m 2 M, this encryption algorithm outputs a
rst level ciphertext that cannot be re-encrypted for another party.
ReEnc(rki!j;CTi): On input a re-encryption key rki!j and a second level ciphertext CTi under public
key pki, this re-encryption algorithm outputs a rst level ciphertext CTj under public key pkj.
Dec2(sk;CT): On input a private key sk and a second level ciphertext CT, this decryption algorithm
outputs a message m 2M or the error symbol ? if CT is invalid.
Dec1(sk;CT): On input a private key sk and a rst level ciphertext CT, this decryption algorithm
outputs a message m 2M or the error symbol ? if CT is invalid.
Next, we review the game-based security denitions for unidirectional PRE systems derived from refs.
[4,5]. Before giving these security notions, we consider the following oracles which together model the
ability of an adversary:
 Public key oracle Opk(i): Run (pki; ski) KeyGen(param), and return pki to A.
 Secret key oracle Osk(pki): Return the secret key ski with respect to pki to A.
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 Re-encryption key oracle Ork(pki; pkj): Run rki!j  ReKeyGen(ski; pkj) and return rki!j to A.
Here ski is the private key with respect to pki.
 Re-encryption oracle Ore(pki; pkj;CTi): Return CTj  ReEnc(ReKeyGen(ski; pkj);CTi) to A.
 First level decryption oracle O1d(pkj;CTj): Return the result of Dec1(CTj; skj) to A. Here CTj is
a rst level ciphertext.
Note that for the last four oracles, we require that pki and pkj are generated by oracleOpk beforehand.
Security of second level ciphertexts. Libert and Vergnaud[5] dened the security notion for a single-
hop unidirectional PRE scheme under replayable chose-ciphertext attacks at the second level. We here
modify this security notion to allow adaptive corruptions of users. In addition, we consider the CCA-
security instead of RCCA-security. We term this notion as IND-2PRE-CCA.
Denition 1 For a single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme E and a PPT adversary A running in two
stages find and guess, we dene A's advantage against the IND-2PRE-CCA security of E as
AdvIND-2PRE-CCAE;A (1
k) =
Pr
240 = 

param Setup(1k); (pki ; (m0;m1);st) AOpk;Osk;Ork;Ore;O1dfind (param);

$ f0; 1g; CT  Enc2(pki ;m); 0  AOpk;Osk;Ork;Ore;O1dguess (param;CT;st):
35  1
2
 ;
where st is some internal state information of adversary A. Here it is mandated that jm0j = jm1j,
and the following requirements are simultaneously satised: (i). A cannot issue the secret key query
Osk(pki); (ii). For any public key pkj, A cannot simultaneously issue the secret key query Osk(pkj)
and the re-encryption key query Ork(pki ; pkj); (iii). For any public key pkj, A cannot simultaneously
issue the secret key query Osk(pkj) and the re-encryption query Ore(pki ; pkj;CT); (iv). For a rst-
level ciphertext CTj output by the re-encryption oracle Ore(pki ; pkj;CT), A cannot issue the rst level
decryption query O1d(pkj;CTj). We refer to the above adversary A as an IND-2PRE-CCA adversary. We
say that a single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme E is (t; qpk; qsk; qrk; qre; qd; )-IND-2PRE-CCA secure, if
for any t-time IND-2PRE-CCA adversary A that makes at most qpk; qsk; qrk; qre and qd queries to oracles
Opk;Osk;Ork;Ore and O1d, respectively, we have AdvIND-2PRE-CCAE;A (1k) 6 .
Remark. As said in ref. [5], explicitly providing adversary A with a second level decryption oracle is
useless, since (i). for the challenge ciphertext CT, A is obviously not allowed to ask the second level
decryption oracle to decrypt it; (ii). while for any other second level ciphertext CT0, adversary A can
rst ask the re-encryption oracle to re-encrypt it into a rst level ciphertext, and then ask the rst level
decryption oracle to decrypt it.
Security of rst level ciphertexts. The above denition provides the adversary with a second level
ciphertext in the challenge phase. In ref. [5], a complementary denition of security is dened to capture
the inability to distinguish rst level ciphertexts. We here review this denition (referred as IND-1PRE-
CCA) as dened in ref. [5], with a slight modication to allow the adaptive corruptions of users and
the CCA-security. In this denition, a rst level ciphertext is provided for adversary A in the challenge
phase. Note that, in a single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme, since the rst level ciphertext cannot be
re-encrypted, A should be allowed to obtain any re-encryption keys, even including those from the target
public key pki to other public keys which are generated by oracle Osk. Furthermore, since A is allowed
to obtain any re-encryption keys, there is no need to provide the re-encryption oracle Ore for him. As the
aforementioned remark, the second level decryption oracle is also unnecessary.
Denition 2 For a single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme E and a PPT adversary A running in two
stages find and guess, we dene A's advantage against the IND-1PRE-CCA security of E as
AdvIND-1PRE-CCAE;A (1
k) =
Pr
240 = 

param Setup(1k); (pki ; (m0;m1);st) AOpk;Osk;Ork;O1dfind (param);

$ f0; 1g; CT  Enc1(pki ;m); 0  AOpk;Osk;Ork;O1dguess (param;CT;st):
35  1
2
 ;
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where st is some internal state information of adversary A. Here it is mandated that jm0j = jm1j, and A
can issue neither Osk(pki) nor O1d(pki ;CT). We refer to the above adversary A as an IND-1PRE-CCA
adversary. We say that a single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme E is (t; qpk; qsk; qrk; qd; )-IND-1PRE-CCA
secure, if for any t-time IND-1PRE-CCA adversary A that makes at most qpk; qpk; qrk and qd queries to
oracles Opk;Osk;Ork and O1d, respectively, we have AdvIND-1PRE-CCAE;A (1k) 6 .
Remark. Note that there is no need to explicitly provide the re-encryption oracle for A, since he can
obtain any re-encryption key by resorting to oracle Ork, and thus he can re-encrypt any second level
ciphertext himself.
Master Secret Security. In ref. [2], Ateniese et al. dened another important security notion, named
delegator secret security, for unidirectional PRE. This security notion captures the intuition that, even
if the dishonest proxy colludes with the delegatee, it is still impossible for them to derive the delegator's
private key in full. We dene this security notion (referred as MSS-PRE) in the following denition:
Denition 3 For a unidirectional PRE scheme E and a PPT adversary A, we dene A's advantage
against the MSS-PRE security of E as
AdvMSS-PREE;A (1
k) = Pr

ski is a valid secret key
param Setup(1k); ski  AOpk;Osk;Ork(param) ;
where it is mandated that the public key pki with respect to ski is generated by Opk, and A cannot
issue the secret key query Osk(pki). We refer to the above adversary as a MSS-PRE adversary. We
say that a unidirectional PRE scheme E is (t; qpk; qsk; qrk; )-MSS-PRE secure, if for any t-time MSS-PRE
adversary A that makes at most qpk; qsk and qrk queries to oracles Opk;Osk and Ork, respectively, we have
AdvMSS-PREE;A (1
k) 6 .
As indicated by the following Lemma, for single-hop unidirectional PREs, the master secret security is
implied by the rst level ciphertext security.
Lemma 1 For a single-hop unidirectional PRE, the master secret security is implied by the rst
level ciphertext security. That is, if there exists an adversary A who can break the MSS-PRE security of
a single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme E , then there also exists an adversary B who can also break E 's
IND-1PRE-CCA security.
The proof for Lemma 1 is straightforward, and hence is omitted here.
4 Our Unidirectional PRE Scheme
In this section, we rst present our single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme, and then give the security
proofs for our scheme. A comparison between our scheme and Libert-Vergnaud's scheme is also given.
4.1 Construction
Before presenting our scheme, some important and necessary principles for designing CCA-secure single-
hop unidirectional PRE schemes should be mentioned: (i) the validity of the second level ciphertexts
should be publicly veriable; otherwise, it will suer from a similar attack as illustrated in [8]5; (ii)
it should also be impossible for the adversary to maliciously manipulate the rst level ciphertext. In
addition, to ensure the rst level ciphertext security, another principle should be kept in mind: (iii) for
a rst level ciphertext CTj re-encrypted from a second level ciphertext CTi, CTj should not contains all
the components of CTi; otherwise, it will inevitably suer from an attack as applied to Shao's scheme
[7].
We will explain how our scheme follows these principles in the following description of our scheme. Our
proposed scheme consists of the following algorithms:
5Weng, J, Deng, R.H, Liu, S, et al. Chosen-ciphertext secure proxy re-encryption without pairings. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2008/509 (2008), http://eprint.iacr.org. This is the full paper of [8].
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Setup(1k): Given a security parameter 1k, this setup algorithm works as follows:
1. Choose bilinear groups (G;GT ) of prime order p > 2k.
2. Pick generators g; g1; u; v; w
$ G, and set Z = e(g; g).
3. Choose a collision-resistant hash function H : G f0; 1g` ! Zp. Choose also a pseudo-random
function (PRF) family F : GT  G ! f0; 1g` `1kf0; 1g`1 such that, given a seed in GT and an
input in G, it outputs an `-bit pseudorandom string. Here ` and `1 are security parameters.
4. Output the public parameters param = (p;G;GT ; g; g1; u; v; w; Z;H; F; `1; `).
KeyGen(param): User i picks xi
$ Zp, and sets his public key as pki = gxi and private key as ski = xi.
ReKeyGen(ski; pkj): On input user i's private key ski = xi and user j's public key pkj = gxj , this
algorithm generates the re-encryption key rki!j = pk
1=ski
j = g
xj=xi .
Enc2(pki;m): To encrypt a message m 2 f0; 1g`1 under the public key pki at the second level, the sender
proceeds as follows:
1. Pick r
$ Zp, and set C1 = gr1 and C2 = pkri .
2. Compute K = Zr and set C3 = [F (K;C1)]` `1 k([F (K;C1)]
`1 m).
3. Pick t
$ Zp, and compute h = H(C1; C3) and C4 =
 
uhvtw
r
.
4. Output the second level ciphertext CTi = (t; C1; C2; C3; C4).
Note that the validity of the second level ciphertext can be publicly veried as in eqs. (1) and (2)
to be given. Hence it is impossible for the adversary to manipulate the second level ciphertext.
Enc1(pkj;m): To encrypt a message m 2 f0; 1g`1 under the public key pkj at the rst level, the sender
proceeds as follows:
1. Pick r
$ Zp, and set C1 = gr1; C 02 = e(pkj; g)r;K = Zr, C3 = [F (K;C1)]` `1k([F (K;C1)]`1 m).
2. Pick t
$ Zp, and compute h = H(C1; C3) and C4 =
 
uhvtw
r
.
3. Output the rst level ciphertext CTi = (t; C1; C
0
2; C3; C4).
Note that the validity of components t; C1; C3 and C4 can be checked as in eq. (1), and the validity of
C 02 can be veried as in eq. (4). So, it is also impossible for the adversary to maliciously manipulate
the rst level ciphertext.
ReEnc(rki!j;CTi): On input a re-encryption key rki!j, an second level ciphertext CTi = (t; C1; C2; C3; C4)
under public key pki, compute h = H(C1; C3), and then check the validity of CTi by testing whether
the following equalities hold:
e(C1; u
hvtw) = e(C4; g1); (1)
e(C1; pki) = e(C2; g1): (2)
If not, output ?. Otherwise, compute C 02 = e(C2; rki!j), and output the rst level ciphertext under
public key pkj as CTj = (t; C1; C
0
2; C3; C4).
Note that, the verication of eqs. (1) and (2) can be alternately done by picking r1; r2
$ Zp and
testing if
e
 
C1; pk
r1
i (u
hvtw)r2

= e (Cr12 c
r2
4 ; g1) : (3)
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In this way, the verication of the well-formedness of ciphertext CTi reduces two pairings at the cost
of only one more multi-exponentiation. Note that the multi-exponentiation can be computed more
eciently than the pairing.
Dec2(ski;CTi): To decrypt a second level ciphertext CTi = (t; C1; C2; C3; C4), user i with private key
ski proceeds as follows:
1. First check the validity of the ciphertext as in eq. (3). If the verication fails, output \?".
2. Compute K = e(C2; g)
1=ski . If [F (K;C1)]` `1 = [C3]` `1 holds, output m = [F (K;C1)]
`1 [C3]`1 ;
else output \?".
Dec1(skj;CTj): On input a private key skj and a rst level ciphertext CTj = (t; C1; C 02; C3; C4), user j
with private key skj proceeds as follows:
1. First check the validity of the ciphertext as in eq. (1). If the verication fails, output \?".
2. Compute K = C
01=skj
2 . Output m = [F (K;C1)]
`1  [C3]`1 if the following equality holds:
[F (K;C1)]` `1 = [C3]` `1 : (4)
Otherwise, output \?".
Remark: Libert-Vergnaud's scheme applies a technique introduced in Boyen-Boneh's selective-ID se-
cure identity-based encryption scheme[20] (refer to the ciphertext component C4 = (u
svk  v)r in Libert-
Vergnaud's scheme). Thus in the security proofs of Libert-Vergnaud's scheme, the adversary must commit
ahead of time to the target user that it wants to attack; otherwise, the challenger will be unable to gener-
ate the challenge ciphertext for the adversary. In contrast, we use a technique inspired by Hohenberger-
Waters' recent signatures scheme[21] (refer to the ciphertext component C4 = (u
hvtw)r in our scheme)6.
As will be seen in our security proofs, this technique enables the challenger to successfully generate the
challenge ciphertext for the adversary, even if the adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt users.
4.2 Security Analysis
The chosen-ciphertext security at the second level for our scheme is asserted by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Our scheme is IND-2PRE-CCA secure, assuming the hash function H is target collision
resistant, F is a pseudorandom function family and the 3-wDBDHI assumption holds in groups (G;GT ).
Proof Without loss of generality, assume that H is target collision resistant and F is a pseudorandom
function family. Then suppose that there is an adversary A who can break the (t; qpk; qsk; qrk; qre; qd; )-
IND-2PRE-CCA security of our scheme. We can construct an algorithm B which can break the (t0; 0)-3-
wDBDHI assumption in (G;GT ) with
0 > 
2 _e(1 + qsk + qrk)
  qd + qre
p
 AdvTCRH;H  AdvPRFF;F ; t0 6 t+O((qpk + qrk + 8qre + 8qd));
where  is the maximum over the time to compute an exponentiation, a multi-exponentiation and a
pairing; _e denotes the base of the natural logarithm.
Suppose algorithm B is given a 3-wDBDHI instance (g;A 1 = g1=a; A1 = ga; A2 = g(a2); B = gb; Q) 2
G5  GT with unknown a; b $ Zp. B's goal is to decide whether Q = e(g; g)b=a
2
. B works by interacting
with adversary A in the IND-2PRE-CCA game as follows:
Initialize. B provides A with public parameters including g1 = A02 ; u = A11 A12 ; v = A21 A22 and
w = A31 A
3
2 for random 0; 1; 2; 3; 1; 2; 3
$ Zp.
6Lai et al. has used this technique to construct an ecient CCA-secure public key encryption scheme [22].
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Find Stage. A issues a series of queries as in the IND-2PRE-CCA game. B maintains a list Llist, and
answers these queries for A as follows:
 Public key oracle Opk(i): B picks xi $ Zp. Next, using the Coron's technique[23], it chooses a number
ci 2 f0; 1; ` 0g such that Pr[ci = 0] = Pr[ci = 1] =  and Pr[ci = ` 0] = 1   2, where  will be
determined later. If ci = ` 0, it sets pki = gxi ; if ci = 0, it sets pki = Axi2 ; if ci = 1, it sets pki = Axi1 .
Next, it adds the tuple (pki; xi; ci) to L
list and returns pki to A.
 Secret key oracle Osk(pki): B rst recovers the tuple (pki; xi; ci) from Llist. If ci = ` 0, it returns
ski = xi to A. Otherwise, B outputs a random bit in f0; 1g and aborts.
 Re-encryption key oracle Ork(pki; pkj): B rst recovers tuples (pki; xi; ci) and (pkj; xj; cj) from Llist,
and then generate the re-encryption key rki!j for A according to the following cases:
{ ci = ` 0: It means that ski = xi. B outputs rki!j = pk1=xij .
{ ci = cj: B returns rki!j = gxj=xi , which is indeed a valid re-encryption key.
{ ci = 1 ^ cj = 0: It means that ski = axi and skj = a2xj. B returns rki!j = A
xj
xi
1 = g
a2xj
axi , which
is indeed a valid re-encryption key.
{ ci = 1^ cj =` ': It means that ski = axi and skj = xj. B returns rki!j = Axj=xi 1 = g
xj
axi , which
is indeed a valid re-encryption key.
{ ci = 0 ^ cj = 1: It means that ski = a2xi and skj = axj. B returns rki!j = A
xj
xi
 1 = g
axj
a2xi , which
is indeed a valid re-encryption key.
{ ci = 0 ^ cj =` ': B outputs a random bit in f0; 1g and aborts.
 Re-encryption oracle Ore(pki; pkj;CTi): B rst parses CTi as (t; C1; C2; C3; C4), and then checks the
validity of the ciphertext as in eq. (3). If the verication fails, it returns \?" to A. Otherwise, B
proceeds to execute the following steps:
1. Recover tuples (pki; xi; ci) and (pkj; xj; cj) from L
list.
2. If (ci = 0 ^ cj = ` 0) does not hold, rst generate the re-encryption key rki!j as in the
re-encryption key oracle Ork, and then return ReEnc(rki!j;CTi) to A.
3. Else (it means that ski = a
2xi and skj = xj), from C1 = g
r
1 = A
r0
2 and C4 = (u
hvtw)r =
A1h+2t+31 A
1h+2t+3
2
r
where h = H(C1; C3), B can compute
Ar1 =
0@ C4
C
1h+2t+3
0
1
1A 11h+2t+3 : (5)
Then compute K = e(A 1; Ar1) = e(g; g)
r, set C 02 = K
xj = e(pkj; g)
r, and return CTj =
(t; C1; C
0
2; C3; C4) to A.
Recall that, in the public parameters u = A11 A
1
2 , v = A
2
1 A
2
2 and w = A
3
1 A
3
2 , 1 (2; 3, resp.) is
blinded by 1 (2; 3, resp.), and hence no information about 1; 2 and 3 is leaked to the adversary.
So, in eq. (5), the equality 1h+2t+3 = 0 mod p information-theoretically holds with probability
at most
1
p
.
 First level decryption oracle O1d(pkj;CTj): Algorithm B rst parses the rst level ciphertext CTj as
(t; C1; C
0
2; C3; C4). Next, it recovers tuple (pkj; xj; cj) from L
list. If cj = ` 0, it means that skj = xj,
and B returns Dec1(skj;CTj) to A. Otherwise, B proceeds as follows:
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1. Compute h = H(C1; C3) and check the validity of the ciphertext as in eq. (1). If the verication
fails, output \?" indicating an invalid ciphertext; else continue to execute the rest steps.
2. Compute Ar1 =
 
C4
C
1h+2t+3
0
1
! 1
1h+2t+3
and then K = e(A 1; Ar1) = e(g; g)
r. Note that, simi-
larly to the analysis in the re-encryption oracle Ore, the chance of 1h + 2t + 3 = 0 mod p
holds with probability at most 1
p
.
3. If [F (K;C1)]` `1 6= [C3]` `1 , output \?" indicating an invalid ciphertext. Otherwise, output
m = [F (K;C1)]
`1  [C3]`1 .
Note that even for the case of 1h + 2t + 3 = 0 mod p, B is still able to reject invalid rst level
ciphertexts. For a rst level ciphertext CTj = (t; C1; C
0
2; C3; C4) under public key pkj, the validity of
t; C1; C3 and C4 can be ensured as in eq. (1). So, B needs only to check the validity of C 02. Suppose
C1 = g
r
1; C3 = [F (K;C1)]` `1k([F (K;C1)]`1 m) and C4 = (uH(C1;C3)vtw)r, where K = e(g; g)r. To
check the validity of C 02, B needs to check whether C 02 = e(pkj; g)r holds. Fortunately, B can do this,
since she can compute e(pkj; g)
r according to the following cases:
{ cj = 1 (it meas that pkj = A
xj
1 ): B can obtain e(pkj; g)r by computing
e(C1; A 1)
xj
0 = (gr1 ; A 1)
xj
0 = (A0r2 ; A 1)
xj
0 = e(A
xj
1 ; g)
r = e(pkj ; g)
r:
{ cj = 0 (it meas that pkj = A
xj
2 ): B can obtain e(pkj; g)r by computing
e(C1; g)
xj
0 = (gr1; g)
xj
0 = (A0r2 ; g)
xj
0 = e(A
xj
2 ; g)
r = e(pkj; g)
r:
Challenge. When A judges that find stage is over, it outputs a public key pki and messages m0;m1 2
f0; 1g`1 with the restrictions specied in the IND-2PRE-CCA game. B responds as follows:
1. Recover tuple (pki ; xi ; ci) from L
list. If ci 6= 0, B outputs a random bit in f0; 1g and aborts.
Otherwise, it means that pki = A
xi
2 , and B proceeds to execute the rest steps.
2. Pick 
$ f0; 1g. Dene C1 = B0 ; C2 = Bxi ; C3 = [F (Q;C1 )]` `1k([F (Q;C1 )]`1  m), t =
 1h+3
2
and C4 = B
(1h
+2t+3) where h = H(C1 ; C

3 ). Return CT
 = (t; C1 ; C

2 ; C

3 ; C

4 ) as the
challenge ciphertext to A.
Observe that, if Q = e(g; g)
b
a2 , CT is indeed a valid challenge ciphertext under public key pki . To see
this, letting r = b
a2
, we have
C1 = B
0 =
 
ga
20 ba2 = (A02 )r = gr1 ;
C2 = B
xi =
 
ga
2xi  ba2 = (Axi2 )r = pkri ;
C3 = [F (Q;C

1 )]` `1k([F (Q;C1 )]`1 m) = [F (Zr

; C1 )]` `1k([F (Zr

; C1 )]
`1 m);
C4 = B
(1h
+2t+3) =

A1h
+2t+3
2
r
=

A1h

1 A
 1h+32 2
1 A
3
1 A1h
+2t+3
2
r
=

A1h

1 A
t2
1 A
3
1 A
1h
+2t+3
2
r
=
 
A11 A
1
2
h   A21 A22 t  (A31 A32 )r = uhvtwr :
On the other hand, whenQ is uniform and independent in GT , the challenge ciphertext CT is independent
of  in the adversary's view.
Guess Stage. Adversary A continues to issue the rest queries. B can respond these queries for A as
in the find stage, since A has to follow the restrictions described in the IND-2PRE-CCA game and the
hash function H is target collision resistant. Observe that, although the challenge ciphertext CT leaks
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the information 1h
+2t+3 = 0 to A, it can be seen that the probability of A's querying a ciphertext
which can cause B to abort is still at most 1
p
.
Output. Eventually, A returns a guess 0 2 f0; 1g. If 0 = , B outputs 0 = 1; else, outputs 0 = 0.
This completes the description of the simulation. We next begin to analyze the simulation. It is
clear that the simulations of oracle Opk is perfect. Let Abort denote the event of B's aborting during the
simulation of oraclesOsk;Ork or in Challenge phase. We have Pr[:Abort] = (1 2)qsk(1 (1 2))qrk >
(1   2)qsk+qrk, which is maximized at opt = qsk+qrk2(1+qsk+qrk) . Using opt, the probability Pr[:Abort] is at
least 1
2 _e(1+qsk+qrk)
. Note that, if even Abort does not happen during the simulation of oracles Osk;Ork and
the Challenge phase, the simulation for oracles Osk;Ork and the challenge ciphertext are perfect.
We proceeds to analyze the simulation of the re-encryption oracle Ore. The simulation of Ore is perfect,
unless 1h + 2t + 3 = 0 mod p happens during the whole simulation (denote this event by ReEErr).
However, as argued before, the equality 1h+ 2t+ 3 = 0 mod p holds in each query with probability
at most 1
p
. So we have Pr[ReEErr] 6 qre
p
.
The simulation of decryption O1d is also perfect, unless 1h+2t+3 = 0 mod p happens during the
whole simulation (denote this event by DecErr). Similarly, we can have Pr[DecErr] 6 qd
p
.
Combining the above results and counting for the target collision resistant of the hash function H
and the pseudorandomness of F , we can see that B's advantage against the 3-wDBDHI assumption
is at least 0 > 
2 _e(1+qsk+qrk)
  qd+qre
p
  AdvTCRH;A   AdvPRFF;F , and B's running time can be bounded by
t0 6 t+O((qpk + qrk + 8qre + 8qd)). This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
The CCA-security at the rst level for our scheme is ensured by the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Our scheme is chosen-ciphertext secure at the rst level, assuming the hash function
H is target collision resistant, F is a pseudorandom function family and 3-wDBDHI assumption holds in
groups (G;GT ).
Proof Without loss of generality, assume that H is target collision resistant and F is a pseudorandom
function family. Then, suppose there is an adversary A who can break the (t; qpk; qsk; qrk; qd; )-IND-1PRE-
CCA security of our scheme, we can construct an algorithm B which can break the (t0; 0)-3-wDBDHI
assumption in (G;GT ) with
0 > 
_e(1 + qsk)
  qd
p
 Adv TCRH;A  AdvPRFF;F ; t0 6 t+O((qpk + qrk + 8qd));
where  and _e have the same meaning as in Theorem 1.
Suppose algorithm B is given a 3-wDBDHI instance (g;A 1 = g1=a; A1 = ga; A2 = g(a2); B = gb; Q) 2
G5  GT with unknown a; b $ Zp. B's goal is to decide whether Q = e(g; g)b=a
2
. B works by interacting
with adversary A in the IND-1PRE-CCA game as follows:
Initialize. B provides A with public parameters including g1 = A02 ; u = A11 A12 ; v = A21 A22 and
w = A31 A
3
2 for random 0; 1; 2; 3; 1; 2; 3
$ Zp.
Find Stage. A issues a series of queries as in the IND-1PRE-CCA game. B maintains a list Llist, and
answers these queries for A as follows:
 Public key oracle Opk(i): B picks xi $ Zp, and ips a random coin ci 2 f0; 1g. If ci = 0, it sets
pki = A
xi
1 ; else it sets pki = g
xi . Next, it adds the tuple (pki; xi; ci) to L
list and returns pki to A.
 Secret key oracle Osk(pki): B rst recovers (pki; xi; ci) from Llist. If ci = 1, it returns ski = xi to A;
else it outputs a random bit in f0; 1g and aborts.
 Re-encryption key oracle Ork(pki; pkj): B rst recovers tuples (pki; xi; ci) and (pkj; xj; cj) from Llist,
and then generates the re-encryption key rki!j for A according to the following cases:
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{ ci = 1: It means that ski = xi. B outputs rki!j = pk1=xij .
{ ci = cj = 0: B returns rki!j = gxj=xi , which is indeed a valid re-encryption key.
{ ci = 0 ^ cj = 1: B returns rki!j = Axj=xi 1 .
 First level decryption oracle O1d(pkj;CTj): Algorithm B rst parses the rst level ciphertext CTj
as (t; C1; C
0
2; C3; C4). Next, it recovers tuple (pkj; xj; cj) from L
list. If cj = 1, it means that skj = xj,
and algorithm B returns Dec1(skj;CTj) to A. Otherwise, B proceeds as follows:
1. Compute h = H(C1; C3) and then check the validity of the ciphertext as in eq. (1). If the
verication fails, output \?"; else continue to execute the rest steps.
2. Compute Ar1 =
 
C4
C
1h+2t+3
0
1
! 1
1h+2t+3
and then K = e(A 1; Ar1) = e(g; g)
r. Note that, simi-
larly to the analysis in the proof of Theorem 1, the chance of 1h+ 2t+ 3 = 0 mod p holds
with probability at most 1
p
.
3. If [F (K;C1)]` `1 6= [C3]` `1 , output \?" indicating an invalid ciphertext. Otherwise, output
m = [F (K;C1)]
`1  [C3]`1 .
Note that even for the case of 1h+2t+3 = 0 mod p, challenger B is still able to reject invalid rst
level ciphertexts. For a rst level ciphertext CTj = (t; C1; C
0
2; C3; C4) under public key pkj = A
xj
1 , the
validity of t; C1; C3 and C4 can be ensured as in eq. (1). So, B needs only to check the validity of the
component C 02. Suppose C1 = g
r
1; C3 = [F (K;C1)]` `1k([F (K;C1)]`1 m) and C4 =
 
uH(C1;C3)vtw
r
,
where K = e(g; g)r. To check the validity of C 02, B needs to check whether C 02 = e(pkj; g)r holds.
Fortunately, B can obtain e(pkj; g)r by computing
e(C1; A 1)
xj
0 = (gr1; A 1)
xj
0 = (A0r2 ; A 1)
xj
0 = e(A
xj
1 ; g)
r = e(pkj; g)
r:
Challenge. When A judges that find stage is over, it outputs a public key pki and two equal-
length messages m0;m1 2 f0; 1g`1 with the restrictions specied in the IND-1PRE-CCA game. B rst
recovers tuple (pki ; xi ; ci) from L
list. If ci = 1, B outputs a random bit and aborts. Otherwise,
B picks  $ f0; 1g, denes C1 = B0 ; C 02 = e(A 1; B)xi ; C3 = [F (Q;C1 )]` `1k([F (Q;C1 )]`1  m),
t =   1h+3
2
and C4 = B
(1h
+2t+3), where h = H(C1 ; C

3 ), and returns CT
 = (t; C1 ; C
0
2 ; C

3 ; C

4 )
as the challenge ciphertext to A.
Observe that, if Q = e(g; g)
b
a2 , CT is indeed a valid challenge ciphertext under public key pki . Letting
r = b
a2
, the well-formedness of C1 ; C

3 and C

4 can be seen as in the proof Theorem 1; while for C
0
2 , its
well-formedness can be seen as below:
C 02 = e(A 1; B)
xi = e(g1=a; gb)xi = e(gaxi ; g)
b
a2 = e(pki ; g)
r :
On the other hand, when Q is uniform and independent in GT , the challenge ciphertext CT is inde-
pendent of  in the adversary's view.
Guess Stage. A continues to issue the rest queries. B can respond these queries for A as in the find
stage, since A has to follow the restrictions described in the IND-1PRE-CCA game and the hash function
H is target collision resistant.
Output. Eventually, A returns a guess 0 2 f0; 1g. If 0 = , B outputs 0 = 1; else, outputs 0 = 0.
This completes the description of the simulation. We next begin to analyze the simulation. It is clear
that the simulations of oracles Opk and Ork are perfect. The simulation of decryption O1d is also perfect,
unless 1h + 2t + 3 = 0 mod p happens during the whole simulation (denote this event by DecErr).
Similarly to the proof in Theorem 1, we can have Pr[DecErr] 6 qd
p
. Let Abort denote the event of B's
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aborting during the simulation of oracle Osk or in Challenge phase. Similarly to the proof of Theorem
1, we have Pr[:Abort] 6 1
_e(1+qsk)
.
Combining the above results and counting for the target collision resistant of the hash functionH and the
pseudorandomness of F , we can easily see that B's advantage against the 3-wDBDHI assumption is at least
0 > 
_e(1+qsk)
  qd
p
  Adv TCRH;A  AdvPRFF;F , and B's running time can be bounded by t0 6 t+O((qpk+qrk+8qd)).
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
From Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, we have
Theorem 3 Our scheme is MSS-PRE secure in the standard model, assuming the 3-wDBDHI as-
sumption holds in groups (G;GT ).
4.3 Comparisons
In Table 1, we compare our scheme with Livert-Vergnaud's scheme[5] (denoted by LV08). We rst
explain some notations used in Table 1. Here jGj and jGT j denote the bit-length of an element in groups
G and GT , respectively. jMj denotes the bit-length of the plaintext in LV08 scheme, and ` denotes
the security parameter in our scheme. jsvkj and jj denote the bit-length of the verication key and
signature of one-time signature used in LV08 scheme[5], respectively. We use tp; te; tme; ts; tv to represent
the computational cost of a bilinear pairing, an exponentiation, a multi-exponentiation, one signing and
one verifying a one-time signature, respectively.
Table 1: Comparisons between LV08 Scheme and Our Scheme
Schemes Our Scheme LV08 Scheme[5]
2-level ciphtxt jZpj+3jGj+` jsvkj+2jGj+1jGT j+jj
Ciphertext Length
1-level ciphtxt jZpj+2jGj+1jGT j+` jsvkj+4jGj+1jGT j+jj
Enc1 1tme + 3te 1tme + 4te + 1ts
Enc2 1tme + 3te 1tme + 2te + 1ts
Computational Cost ReEnc 3tp + 2tme 2tp + 4te + 1tv
Dec2 3tp + 2tme + 1te 3tp + 2te + 1tv
Dec1 2tp + 2tme + 1te 5tp + 2te + 1tv
Security CCA RCCA
Corruption Model Adaptive Non-adaptive
Without RO? Yes Yes
The comparison results indicate that our scheme has a better overall performance than LV08 scheme
in term of both ciphertext length and computational cost. Most importantly, our scheme achieve the
CCA-security, while LV08 scheme only satises the RCCA-security. The latter is a weaker variant of
CCA-security in the sense that it cannot withstand the attack by re-randomizing the challenge ciphertext.
In addition, our scheme can be proved in the adaptive corruption model, while LV08 scheme cannot.
5 Conclusions
We presented a unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme, and proved its CCA-security in the adaptive
corruption model without random oracles. Compared with the best know unidirectional PRE scheme
proposed by Libert and Vergnaud, our scheme enjoys the advantages of both higher eciency and stronger
security.
Many interesting questions still remain. For example, (1) how to construct a CCA-secure multi-hop
unidirectional PRE scheme (either with or without random oracles); (2) study impossibility (or possibility)
of constructing a CCA-secure (either bidirectional or unidirectional) PRE scheme without parings in the
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standard model; (3) how to construct a CCA-secure PRE scheme with key privacy[25].
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